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The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra 
By Karen E. Smith 
Abstract 
In late August 1968, following a British proposal, Nigeria announced it would allow an 
International Observer Team into the country to show that it was not pursuing a campaign 
of genocide in Biafra. This article analyses why the United Kingdom pushed for the 
creation of the observer team, and shows how the team’s work was incorporated into the 
government’s justifications for its support of the Nigerian government. The experience of 
the observer team illustrates the difficulties of providing an ‘objective’ view regarding 
whether or not genocide is taking place.  
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The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra 
In late August 1968, just after it launched a ‘final offensive’ to defeat the ‘Biafra’ rebels, 
the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) announced it would allow an 
International Observer Team into the country to show that it was not pursuing a campaign 
of genocide against Igbos in Biafra.1 It did so under some pressure to take such a course 
of action: the British government had signalled strongly that its continued support for the 
FMG, including arms supplies, would depend on the FMG’s acceptance of observers. 
From September 1968 until the end of the war in January 1970, a small team of observers 
from the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Poland, Sweden, the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) operated in FMG-controlled territory and 
repeatedly reported that no genocide was taking place in the country. The British 
government used those findings to justify its policy of support for the FMG. 
The observer team hardly features in recent discussions of the Nigeria-Biafra war, 
or even in some older pieces.2 Only Suzanne Cronje discussed it at much length, in The 
world and Nigeria.3 Yet it is curious that the observer team was sent at all, as it is an 
indication of how much pressure the UK itself was under as a result of the claims that a 
genocide was being perpetrated against Biafrans. 
This article explains why the UK pressed for the FMG to invite observers into 
Nigeria, highlighting the need for the British government to rebut accusations that it was 
abetting genocide in Nigeria, especially by continuing to supply arms to the FMG. These 
accusations generated concern within the government despite the fact that the UK had not 
yet acceded to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Their concern stemmed not from questions about the UK’s conformity to the 
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legal norm against genocide, but instead from doubts about its conformity with the social 
norm against genocide.  
 This article first sets out the argument that there are two norms against genocide, 
a legal one (embodied in the 1948 Genocide Convention) and a social one. The main part 
of the article then reveals the decision-making and diplomacy regarding the creation of 
the observer team – as disclosed in the relevant papers in the UK National Archives. The 
social norm created pressures on the government to take action that it viewed as inimical 
to its interests (such as imposing an arms embargo on the FMG), and thus it needed 
specifically to rebut the claims of genocide to relieve the pressure. The section also 
shows how the observer team’s conclusions were used by the UK government to justify 
its policy (and to resist any changes to it), while activists and observers argued the 
observer team was biased. This case illustrates how and why it is difficult to use observer 
teams to ensure an ‘objective’ determination of whether genocide is taking place or not. 
 
1. The social and legal norms against genocide  
This article uses the concept of ‘norms’ when assessing the impact that the claims 
about genocide in Nigeria had on British foreign policy. Norms are ‘collective 
expectations about proper behavior for a given identity’.4 Norms can have different 
impacts on states: they can require action (to comply with the norm), constrain action 
(again, to comply with the norm), and enable action (which could be justified as in 
compliance with the norm).5 However, norms may also have little or no impact on states: 
in other words, states’ behaviour may not conform with the norm at all, and they may 
resist pressure or incentives to take action in accordance with the norm. This may be 
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because the costs of so doing are perceived to be greater than the costs of not conforming 
to the norm. There are also different types of norms – legal, social, professional, cultural, 
and so on – and they may have different influences on states.6 
 As I have argued elsewhere, there are two norms against genocide, a legal one and 
a social one.7 The legal norm is set out in the Genocide Convention, which provides a 
definition of genocide and a set of rules by which states are to punish and prevent 
genocide. The definition of genocide in the convention is widely considered to be 
constricting, with its demanding requirement to prove ‘intent to destroy’. Furthermore the 
convention does not mandate any particular action with respect to ‘prevention’, instead 
setting out certain requirements regarding the punishment of individuals for carrying out 
acts of genocide.  
 The UK’s attitude towards the Genocide Convention was lukewarm in 1948, and 
for twenty years afterwards. It abstained in the UN Sixth Committee vote on the 
convention, and then very nearly abstained from voting on it in the General Assembly, 
because of concerns that acceptance of the convention into British law would require 
changes to the laws on granting asylum and the Cabinet had not agreed to this. Though 
the UK did in the end vote for the convention, the British delegate told the General 
Assembly that the UK’s vote was without prejudice to the right to grant asylum.8 The UK 
did not sign the convention,9 and only moved to accede to it after Harold Wilson became 
prime minister in 1964. Until then, a bureaucratic standoff between the Foreign Office (in 
favour of accession due to the reputational costs of remaining aloof) and the Home Office 
(adamant that there was no support for changing the UK’s law on asylum) had prevented 
accession. Wilson, however, supported accession and after he assumed office, his 
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government put the convention forward for approval by parliament, though not until 
1968.10 The main debate on the convention in the House of Commons took place in 
February 1969; the UK formally acceded to it on 30 January 1970.  
There is little evidence of British government concern about any legal 
requirements that the UK might have vis-à-vis Nigeria as a result of accession to the 
Genocide Convention. Indeed, the Foreign Office was confident that accession would not 
lead to claims that the UK was violating the convention by supporting the FMG, because 
the observer team had proven that FMG was not committing genocide.11 Had the 
observer team not been dispatched to Nigeria and found no evidence of genocide, then it 
is possible that when the UK acceded to the convention, it could have been accused by 
Biafra’s supporters of contravening its legal obligations.12 But there is no evidence in the 
files in the UK National Archives or parliamentary debates to suggest that the question of 
accession to the convention was linked to decisions about the observer team. 
 What this indicates is that the legal norm played little to no role in the British 
government’s considerations of either its vulnerability to criticism over its policy 
regarding Nigeria, or its defence of its policy. Nor did the legal norm figure highly in 
public contestation of the policy. Instead, the case of the UK and genocide in Biafra 
illustrates the impact that social norms can have on foreign policy-making.  
The social norm against genocide entails a wider definition of genocide: in public 
parlance, genocide usually just means large-scale killing (as happened in Cambodia under 
the Khmer Rouge regime, for example). The social norm also requires a response going 
beyond the legal norm: genocide is seen as raising ‘a legal, political and moral obligation, 
an irrevocable imperative that cannot be pushed aside but must be acted on…’13 In the 
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last two decades, this has entailed an expectation that states will take measures to stop 
genocide, measures which ultimately should include the use of coercive military force if 
that is what it takes to stop the killing. But before the end of the Cold War – when 
‘humanitarian intervention’ was beyond the limits of acceptable action in international 
affairs14 – the social norm against genocide meant that governments should take action 
short of intervention, such as imposing arms embargoes or criticising countries in 
international fora. Indicators of the social norm in discourse include the use of the term 
genocide to describe killings without reference to the Genocide Convention definition, 
and use of the related argument that a government’s policy has to change to try to stop 
the killings. Whether and how the government does so indicates the norm’s impact: did 
the norm enable, require or constrain action? To investigate the way the social norm 
impacted British policy vis-à-vis Nigeria, I have analysed the public discourse 
(declarations by the government, debates within parliament, newspaper editorials), 
reviewed the relevant official documents in the UK National Archives and read the 
memoirs of the key British actors involved in the discussions.  
 
2. The UK and the Nigeria-Biafra war  
On 30 May 1967, the military ruler of the eastern regions of Nigeria (‘Biafra’), 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, announced the secession of Biafra from the Nigerian federation, and 
its independence as a sovereign state. He did so following the massacre of perhaps 30,000 
Igbos in the north of the country in September 1966,15 and his declaration of 
independence told the people of Eastern Nigeria that ‘[you are] aware that you can no 
longer be protected in your lives and in your property by any government based outside 
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Eastern Nigeria’.16 In response, the federal government (also military-ruled) imposed a 
blockade on Biafra and attempted to regain control of the region by military means. It did 
not do so until January 1970.  
Initially, after Ojukwu had declared Biafran independence, the Wilson 
government adopted a ‘neutral’ position, though it continued to fill the Nigerian 
government’s orders for supplies of arms.17 But British support for the FMG soon 
became clear, reflecting an understanding of its national interests.  
Those interests were economic in the first place: ‘secession would threaten the 
security of the 3,500 subjects in the Eastern region and put investments at risk, especially 
in the oil industry’.18 Shell-British Petroleum was a major investor in Nigeria, and over a 
tenth of British oil imports came from Nigeria.19 When the Six-Day War broke out in the 
Middle East in June 1967, the importance of securing oil imports from Nigeria was 
reinforced. Secondly, the British feared the implications of the breakup of states in 
Africa: ‘if the principle of secession on a tribal basis were once accepted there would be 
chaos on the [African] continent’.20 Thirdly, there were ‘geopolitical concerns’. Nigeria 
was potentially a major power in Africa; a breakup of the federation would reduce such 
power – and allow France and its francophone allies in the region to exercise more 
influence. The UK also needed to balance Soviet support for the FMG (the Soviets were 
also selling arms to it).21 
Arms sales were justified by the government because it ‘was undoubtedly right to 
help an ex-colony and fellow Commonwealth country when it faced secession….to 
change our policy now when both sides have reached virtually irreconcilable positions, 
would have a catastrophic effect on our relations with the Federal Government and would 
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put our interests in Nigeria in jeopardy.’22 In August 1968, in Parliament, the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson, publicly defended arms sales in this 
way: 
Our supplies have amounted to about 15 percent by value of Nigeria’s 
total arms purchases…[I]f we were to cut off our supply of defence 
equipment unilaterally…we would, I believe, lose our capacity to 
influence the Federal Government.23 
The 15 percent figure was inaccurate: the UK had supplied most Nigerian arms 
imports in 1963, less than 40 percent in 1964-66, but almost half in 1967.24 (It was 
revealed after the war that British arms imports amounted to considerably more than that 
during the war itself: British supplies made up 79.19 percent of Nigerian imports in 1968 
and an astonishing 97.36 percent in 1969.25) It would have damaged the FMG’s war 
effort had the UK cut off arms supplies, and almost certainly led the FMG to acquire 
supplies from the USSR: this made the issue of a British arms embargo on Nigeria such a 
potent one. In comparison, at the start of the conflict, the US had refused to supply arms 
to either side (arguably an easier decision than that facing the UK, given that the US had 
not been a major arms supplier to Nigeria),26 in June 1968 France and the Netherlands 
announced an arms embargo on Nigeria (though within two months the French 
government was supplying arms to Biafra), and a month later Belgium did so.27  
As discussed further below, the Wilson government came under considerable 
pressure to halt arms sales to the FMG, and was facing accusations that by not halting 
arms sales, it was aiding a government that was engaging in genocide. The rest of this 
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article explores why and how the Wilson government tried to ‘square the circle’ by 
combating the accusations of genocide and continuing its support for the FMG. 
 
Accusations of genocide in Nigeria and opposition to UK arms sales 
Ojukwu referred to the massacres of Igbos in 1966 as a ‘genocide’ and the core 
reason why the Igbos needed their own homeland. In an address to the Organisation of 
African Unity on 5 August 1968, he accused the FMG of waging a ‘genocidal war’ 
against Biafra, and argued that it was ‘appalling’ that ‘this palpable genocide is being 
openly financed and directed by major NON-AFRICAN powers whose interest in the 
event is the economic and political advantage of their own countries’.28 (Although not 
directly named, the UK was seen as the principal supporter of the FMG, and therefore of 
its ‘genocidal war’.) The accusations of genocide were repeated by what some regarded 
as a very well-oiled Biafran propaganda machine, and, for John Stremlau, served the 
primary purpose of magnifying the external threat so as to promote internal unity.29 
Nonetheless, the accusations were repeated elsewhere. The Senegalese and Tanzanian 
presidents (Leopold Senghor and Julius Nyerere) also labelled the Nigerian policy as 
’genocide’, though it should be noted that most African governments opposed the Biafran 
move to secede.30 
Above all, though, the genocide claims were heard in Europe. The capture of Port 
Harcourt, Biafra’s only link to the outside world, by Nigerian forces in May 1968, 
combined with a blockade of Biafra that seemed to be the cause of malnutrition and 
starvation of increasing numbers of victims, gave the accusations of genocide enough 
force to generate widespread public concern in Europe. For example, in the wake of the 
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fall of Port Harcourt, several British newspapers used Holocaust imagery: ‘worse than 
Belsen’; ‘fate could be as dreadful as that of the victims of the Nazi concentration 
camps’.31 It was widely believed (in Biafra and outside it) that the Igbos would be at risk 
if they were defeated by the FMG. Such fears were easily fuelled by the words of 
Nigeria’s top military commander, Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, who declared in August 
1968, ‘I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one piece to eat before their 
capitulation. We shoot at everything that moves.’32 As The Guardian noted, the Nigerian 
government may not have had any intention of committing genocide, but it was less 
certain this applied also on the battlefield.33 
For almost a year, from November 1967 to August 1968, the UK considered 
participating in a Commonwealth peacekeeping or observer force as a solution to the war: 
it could help persuade the Biafrans to surrender because their safety would be guaranteed 
by the external force.34 The idea was pushed principally by the Commonwealth 
Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, who was attempting to arrange a ceasefire and 
negotiations between the two sides. The UK was in principle willing to contribute, but 
only if certain conditions were met first, including that Canada would help pay for the 
force, and India and Ghana would contribute to it. 35 In the end, however, the idea did not 
gather enough support – in Nigeria or the rest of the Commonwealth. Instead, during the 
course of the summer 1968, the proposal was transformed into the idea of sending 
observers from the International Committee of the Red Cross or other governments who 
would monitor the FMG’s conduct of the war.36 
 Throughout the first half of 1968, opposition to British policy increased – as 
concern grew also about the accusations of genocide in Nigeria. In particular, the 
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government’s defence of arms sales was criticised intensely inside and outside 
parliament. The Archbishops of Westminster and Canterbury called for a ban on arms 
supplies to Nigeria.37 In May 1968, the Church of Scotland assembly unanimously called 
for the ends of arms sales to the FMG, and one speaker claimed the arms supplies would 
‘link Britain’s name in history with premeditated massacre’.38 Leading newspapers such 
as The Times echoed the call.39 The Guardian argued in July 1968 that ‘stopping the arms 
is therefore the best way to save Biafrans from both slaughter and starvation’.40  
Although ‘genocide’ was not a term that was used very often in parliamentary 
debates (except, somewhat paradoxically, by those MPs and ministers arguing that no 
genocide was taking place), several MPs used very similar terms. On 11 June 1968 in the 
House of Commons, one MP asked the Foreign Secretary whether he was ‘aware of the 
depth of feeling in the country that arms supplied to the Nigerian Government should be 
cut off so that we should not be a party to the slaughter?’. Another asked him to 
‘reconsider policy on this point [supply of arms], particularly now when the dangers of 
massive slaughter appear to be brooding over the scene’. A day later, an MP argued that 
it has ‘now become a war leading possibly the extermination of a race’. Another said that 
‘so long as we are sending arms we are partly responsible for the bloodshed’.41  
However, it should also be noted that the number of public protesters was never 
particularly high: about 700 people attended a march in early June 1968; a 1968 petition 
calling for a ban on arms sales was signed by 2000 people.42 Although the Labour Party 
conference passed resolutions calling for an end to arms sales in 1968 and 1969,43 the 
then Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, noted later in his memoirs that ‘the great 
majority of Labour and Conservative M.P.s supported the Government…so we always 
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had a decisive majority’.44 Thus while the Nigeria-Biafra war was ‘the most consistently 
significant foreign policy issue’ in 1968-1970,45 the government was not in serious 
danger of falling over it. Instead, it appears that the moral arguments used by protesters – 
including the claims that arms sales were aiding a government engaging in genocide – 
had a particular force that put the British government in a bind and led it to make 
adjustments to its policy. Wilson wrote later that Nigeria ‘took up far more of my time, 
and that of ministerial colleagues, and far more moral wear and tear than any other issue. 
Commentators…rarely recognise the impact of these moral pressures, internal as well as 
external.’46 
 Evidence of the impact of the moral pressure can be seen in the government’s 
response to it. In the course of the 12 June House of Commons debate, the Foreign 
Secretary, Michael Stewart, made the following declaration: 
If we make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal 
Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria but to proceed 
without mercy either with the slaughter or the starvation of the Ibo people, 
or if we were to make the supposition that it were the intention of the 
Federal Government to take advantage of a military situation in order to 
throw aside with contempt any terms of reasonable settlement, then the 
arguments which justified the policy we have so far pursued would fall, 
and we would have to reconsider, and more than reconsider, the action we 
have so far taken.47 
The British government needed not only to defend arms sales to the FMG, but also to 
indicate that it would stop supplying arms if the FMG appeared to be slaughtering Igbos. 
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Arguably this shows the impact of the social norm: if slaughter – or genocide as some 
supporters of Biafra termed it – is happening, then government policy must change.  
The same message about the conditions for continued British support was given 
directly by Wilson to the Federal Nigerian Commissioner for Information and Labour, 
Chief Anthony Enaharo, in a meeting following the 12 June debate. At the same time, 
Wilson also asked what the FMG’s views were on the possible stationing of a 
Commonwealth observer force before a ceasefire were in place, and was told only that 
the FMG would consider it.48 
 After the FMG publicly announced that it was launching the ‘final push’ to defeat 
the Biafrans on 26 August, there was an uproar in the House of Commons, and a noisy 
demonstration outside it. The House of Commons has been recalled to discuss the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, but the government had been successfully pressed into 
adding a day during which there could be a debate on Nigeria. That debate occurred on 
27 August. It was particularly uncomfortable for the government.  
Numerous fears were expressed that the ‘final push’ would lead to genocide/mass 
slaughter of the Igbos. One Conservative MP said, ‘If this invasion takes place and if 
resistance continues, there is the gravest possible danger of genocide.’ Another said that 
the UK government’s policy ‘is not defensible if it leads in Nigeria itself to indifference 
to civilian suffering and eventually to the destruction of a whole people’. Once again, it 
was the British government’s policy on arms supplies that attracted the most criticism. A 
Labour MP accused the government ‘of helping the war and worsening the terrible 
situation’.49 A motion calling on the government to halt arms sales had been tabled by 
fifty MPs, and they tried to force a vote on it, to no avail – amid much ‘turmoil’ and ‘near 
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chaos’ in the chamber, as both MPs and spectators in the gallery protested angrily.50 A 
large demonstration in Trafalgar Square marched to 10 Downing Street and ‘nearly 
succeeded in battering their way through the front door’.51  
 That very evening, Chief Enahoro was called in to meet the Commonwealth 
Secretary, George Thomson, and informed that if there had been a vote, the government 
would have been defeated (a view which contradicts Stewart’s optimism, reported above, 
but seems to reflect both a real fear of the strength of opposition, and a bargaining chip 
vis-à-vis the FMG). Thomson told Enahoro that if the British government was to continue 
its present policy in the midst of a final offensive by the FMG, then there needed to be 
‘an invitation to outside observers to accompany the troops and to testify that there were 
no massacres’. If the FMG did not do so, then the British government would not continue 
supporting the FMG. Enahoro was then given a paper drawn up by the Commonwealth 
Office on the proposal for observers.52 The paper suggested that the federal government 
might find it 
helpful to have a small number of outside observers attached to their own 
forces at this stage in the campaign. … The main purpose of such 
observers would be to demonstrate that the Federal authorities were not 
seeking to conceal the truth and to provide a degree of objective and 
authoritative checking on future propaganda stories about misconduct by 
Federal troops, so that world opinion could be quickly reassured about the 
true facts in a supposed incident.53 
The International Red Cross would be the most suitable organisation to arrange for such 
observers. 
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 Two days later, the Nigerian High Commissioner told Thomson that they were to 
make an announcement about international observers that very day.54 Thus, although 
various UK ministers and diplomats portrayed the observer team as having been proposed 
by the FMG – not only did the British push for the Nigerians to take such a move, but 
they made it clear the kind of team desired. However, Stremlau suggests that the Nigerian 
head of state, Yakubu Gowon, agreed to invite in observers ‘to show his good faith’ – 
given that British arms exporters had already committed themselves to delivering arms 
months in advance, he was not under serious pressure to comply with the British 
demands, plus he could also purchase equipment from Russia.55  
Of more relevance to this article is that the Wilson government needed the FMG 
to agree to observers to reduce the pressure it was under at home and abroad, as one 
official indicated in an internal request for funding a third observer: 
The Biafrans have gained a great deal of international sympathy by 
claiming that the Federal Government are bent on a policy of genocide. 
This sympathy throughout Europe and North America has led to 
widespread and most embarrassing criticisms of H.M.G.’s [Her Majesty’s 
Government] own policy…The Federal Government’s decision to 
establish a team of international observers is a valuable step in the 
direction of countering Biafran allegations of genocide, and it is very 
much in our own interests that the observer team should succeed.56 
The creation of the observer team indicates that the social norm against genocide 
had an impact, though not exactly the one hoped for by the British government’s critics – 
the government needed to prove that genocide was not being perpetrated in Nigeria. This 
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would enable it to continue to support the FMG, including by selling arms to it. The 
social norm had enough of an impact to prompt a response to the concerns about 
genocide, but not enough to prompt a change in policy (suspension of arms supplies).  
 
The Observer Team 
The formal invitation from the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs was directed 
to Canada, Poland, Sweden, the UK, the OAU, and the UN Secretary-General.57 It stated 
that the ‘Federal Government’s reason for establishing this Observer Team is in 
pursuance of its desire to satisfy the world opinion, contrary to the malicious propaganda 
of the rebels, that there is no intentional or planned systematic and wanton destruction of 
civilian lives or their property in the war zone’. It invited one observer from each country 
or organization, who would ‘visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas, on the 
Federal-controlled side, to witness the conduct of Federal troops – re charges of 
genocide, etc.’58 The FMG would provide transport, and board and accommodation, for 
the observers. The team was to serve for two months.  
 The FMG allowed each observer to have an assistant, but did not bow to pressure 
from the British government to permit the further expansion of the observer team. The 
FMG eventually agreed to allow the team to remain in Nigeria ‘until such time as may be 
determined by the Federal Military Government unilaterally or by mutual consultation 
with the respective governments or organisations’59 – though only after prodding by the 
British government, which reminded Nigeria of the usefulness of the observers in ‘taking 
the sting out of Biafran claims of genocide’.60 The Nigerian government would not agree, 
however, to allow the observer team to operate in Biafra (assuming the Biafrans would 
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allow them to do so), even though many MPs and some officials in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office tried to push for this.61 Allowing the observers to operate in 
Biafra would confer status on the rebels.62 
Between September 1968 and January 1970, the observers periodically issued 
reports on their activities, which included visits to displaced persons camps, prisoner of 
war camps, and villages that had been retaken by Nigerian federal forces. Their reports 
invariably found no evidence of genocide. The first report, of 2 October 1968, concluded 
that ‘There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or 
their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.’63 Every 
subsequent report repeated that message.64  
 
Using the Observer Team’s Findings to Justify Policy 
The British government considered that the observer team had performed the 
important task of proving there was no genocide, thus enabling it to reassure public and 
parliamentary opinion and reduce the pressure to suspend arms supplies to the FMG. In 
October 1968, Wilson told the Commons that  
the best guarantee against what the whole House seeks to avoid, namely, 
genocide or a massacre as a result of the last stages of the fighting, is our 
success in securing the agreement of the Federal Government to the 
appointment of international observers, including a very distinguished 
military officer from this country. The reports which we are getting are 
more reassuring than some of us might have expected two or three months 
ago.65 
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Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart told the Commons in November 1968 that ‘the story 
about genocide has been proved beyond doubt to be completely false.’66 The following 
month, Wilson directly linked the observer team to domestic concerns about genocide: 
‘Because of the concern of this House and all of us to prevent genocide, massacres and 
undisciplined action, we have a military observer at the battlefront, reporting all the time, 
together with other observers, on what is happening.’67 
A confidential diplomatic report written by the British High Commissioner in 
Nigeria (Sir Leslie Glass) in March 1970 (shortly after the end of the war) argued that the 
‘value of the [Observer] Team’s work cannot be over-estimated’. The observer teams’ 
reports refuting the accusation of genocide ‘played a large part – perhaps a key part – in 
enabling Her Majesty’s Government to resist demands that we should change our policy 
of support for the FMG.’68  
Sir David Hunt, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria for much of the war, 
later wrote of the observer team: 
The genocide story was killed stone dead by the most sensible action on 
the propaganda side that the Federal Government ever took [inviting in the 
observer team]. It is startling evidence of the credulity of the world that it 
was thought necessary to go to such lengths, especially as Nigerians, very 
reasonably, resent foreign interference.’69 
In his memoirs, Michael Stewart justified the continued arms sales to Nigeria principally 
because Britain could not side with secessionists and would respect existing state 
boundaries. It would have been different if Gowon had been brutal, but his ‘conduct of 
the war can only be described as chivalrous, old-fashioned though that word is. He agreed 
 19
that his troops should be accompanied by U.N. observers, whose verdict on their conduct 
was favourable.’70 But as seen below, there were still doubts about the observer team’s 
objectivity and the extent to which its conclusions were credible. 
 
Criticisms of the Observer Team 
Despite the British government’s faith in the observer team’s findings, the team 
was criticised in Biafra and by its supporters in the UK and elsewhere. The Biafran 
government claimed it was ‘nothing but a shameless conspiracy’, aimed at preventing the 
UN and OAU ‘from taking a positive stand or positive action against the genocide being 
practiced.’71 Ojukwu claimed that the observer exercise would ‘hardly achieve anything 
that can be presented to the world as original, accurate and impartial’ so long as there are 
so few of them and their movements are restricted on the federal side.72 
In the UK, The Guardian expressed scepticism: ‘There is alarming evidence that 
the assurances given by General Alexander [the British observer] and the other observers 
– that Biafran fears of “genocide” are groundless – are not the whole truth.’ The 
newspaper cited as evidence the televised picture of a Biafran being shot dead by an 
FMG officer, the shooting of four Red Cross workers, air raids on crowded Biafran 
markets, and the reports of a group of Canadian MPs that there was an element of 
genocide in the war. It urged the UK to put pressure on the FMG to reach a compromise, 
confederal solution.73 A piece in The Times noted that the conclusions of the observer 
team may have helped ‘dispel in the public mind some of the horror raised by the sight’ 
of that televised execution, but then the news that millions of people could die of 
starvation disturbed them again.74 
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The impartiality of the British members of the observer team was questionable. 
There was evidence that they gathered intelligence for the British government, 
commented on the military performance of the FMG, considered what the FMG could do 
better and assessed FMG military needs.75 Two somewhat bizarre episodes at the end of 
the war illustrate this. In 1970, the Sunday Telegraph published the Scott report, written 
by a defence adviser to the British High Commission in Lagos, which not only criticised 
the FMG’s conduct of the war but also indicated the extent to which the UK supported 
the FMG. Scott passed the report to Colonel Douglas Cairns, a British member of the 
observer team at the time, who then showed it to General Alexander, a former member of 
the observer team. Alexander then passed a copy to the journalist Jonathan Aitken, who 
published it without permission. Cairns, Aitken and the editor of the Sunday Telegraph 
were charged with violating the Official Secrets Act (they were all acquitted).76 The key 
point here is not about the case, but the fact that there was communication about the 
FMG’s war efforts between the British High Commission and the British members of the 
observer team – thus feeding doubts about the impartiality of the observer team itself. In 
the second case, a British member of the observer team, Ian Walsworth-Bell, was 
withdrawn from Nigeria by the Foreign Office because he had been in too much contact 
with FMG army officers; Walsworth-Bell later claimed he had been wrongfully 
dismissed, as he had been instructed to obtain details of Russian arms supplies to the 
FMG, to make reports for the Nigerian army and to tell the Nigerians to destroy a Biafran 
airstrip. The social security tribunal rejected his claim for compensation, but indicated 
that the evidence provided about his work could have been truthful.77 These cases raise 
 21
obvious questions about the extent to which the observer team was acting in British 
interests rather than objectively investigating the accusations of genocide. 
 Cronje argues that the observer team was not neutral; it was not instructed on 
what genocide is nor how to identify it; it was dependent on the FMG for transport and 
accommodation; it never investigated the 1966 massacres of Igbos.78 Indeed, at no point 
did the British government ever provide its observers with a definition of genocide, nor 
did it provide guidance on how one might determine whether or not a genocide was 
taking place or had taken place.79 
 The observer team did refer to the Genocide Convention definition in one of its 
reports,80 but as Cronje notes, all of its members except for the UN representative were 
military men (often retired): ‘they had no means of judging in legal terms what 
constituted genocide, and it was within their terms of reference to pronounce on this 
issue. At the very least the team should have included international jurists and 
professionals experienced in the investigation of crime and the recording of evidence, not 
to speak of social workers, medical men and people capable of telling an Ibo from a non-
Ibo.’81  
 Nonetheless, the observer team – and the related pressure on the FMG by the UK 
government to moderate the level of violence – may have had some impact on the 
ground. Wilson later wrote that the observers’ ‘presence was designed to be a guarantee 
against “genocide”’.82 This is not how it was presented initially, but the extent to which 
the UK’s expressions of concern and its insistence on the observer team may have helped 
to prevent violence against civilians merits further research.  
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 The story of the observer team shows that the social norm against genocide had an 
impact on the British government: to continue with its policy of support for the FMG, 
including by supplying arms, it had to assuage public concerns about genocide. However, 
the story also illustrates the difficulty of providing ‘objective’ evidence regarding a 
purported ongoing genocide. The suspicion is that any observer team is simply there to 
confirm the views of the sending state/organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has not taken a position on whether genocide was or was not perpetrated in 
Nigeria in the late 1960s; that is a matter for debate among historians and experts on the 
region. Instead, it has sought to show the power of language, and particularly, of one 
word. ‘Genocide’ is indeed so powerful that its usage is linked to the imperative to act to 
stop it. As Alain Destexhe has argued, genocide ‘is the first and greatest of the crimes 
against humanity both because of its scale and the intent behind it: the destruction of a 
group. It is, therefore, a crime that obliges the international community to respond’.83 
Although there has long been controversy over what that response should entail (more 
recently, for example, the debate centres on military action with or without United 
Nations Security Council authorization), there has also long been an understanding that 
there should be an appropriate response. Wilson’s government clearly felt and understood 
this pressure.  
This, however, means that those governments, such as Wilson’s, who are being 
pressed to ‘take action’ will try to avoid using the word – because if a situation is not 
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genocide, then there is less pressure to do something. As we have seen in the case of the 
observer team to Nigeria, a decision to send an observer team to investigate whether 
genocide is ongoing or not, can be linked to protecting the interests of outside states not 
to intervene or change policy, which thus leads commentators and others to cast doubt on 
their objectivity.  
 This leads to a conundrum: if genocide is never acknowledged while it is possibly 
ongoing (so as to avoid having to respond to it), it will only ever be ‘discovered’ after the 
fact. One way out of this conundrum is for governments, international organizations and 
civil society to pay more attention to the task of preventing genocide (and other mass 
atrocities), entailing a shift in emphasis from short-term crisis response to long-term 
prevention. Numerous commentators have urged such a shift and there are indications of 
government response, as with the 2005 UN agreement on ‘responsibility to protect’, 
which includes the imperative to prevent mass atrocities, and the creation of the US 
Atrocities Prevention Board in 2011.84 Prevention may thus become a higher priority for 
governments and international organizations. 
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